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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----00000----

JAMES M. BURROWS,
plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
PAUL MCGILL, individually,
P-M ENGINEERS, INC., PAUL
McGILL, RICHARD K. KLEIN,
GAIL 0. PAYNE, as Administrative committee of the
profit Sharing and Retirement Plan of P-M ENGINEERS,
INC.,

CASE NO. 14621

Defendants-Appellant.
----00000----

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
----00000----

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover vested benefits
accumulated in the account of plaintiff in a Profit Sharing and Retirement Plan maintained by defendants.

The

defendant, P-M Engineers counterclaimed for breach of
contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
plaintiff's Motion for summary JUdgment was
granted awarding plaintiff his vested accumulated benefits
in the profit Sharing and Retirement Plan and dismissing
defendants' counterclaim.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
plaintiff seeks to have the Summary JUdgment of
the Lower court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
The defendant, P-M Engineers, Inc.,

hereinafter

referred to as the company, was a corporation organized
under the Laws of the state of Utah to provide Engineering Services (R 405).
sharing

a~d

During the year 1958, a Profit

Retirement Plan.

(hereinafter referred to

as "The plan") was established by P-M Engineers,
for the benefit of the employees

(R 71).

Inc.,

The plan

provided for an Administrative committee of 3 members,
each of whom were appointed by the company.
During 1974, the Administrative committee Members
were defendants, Gail

o.

Payne, Richard Klein and Paul

McGill, the President of P-M Engineers, Inc ..

In

addition, the defendants were all employees and members
of the Board of Directors of P-M Engineers and coparticipants with the plaintiff under the profit Sharing
and Retirement Plan.
From May of 1959, to January 7,1975, the plaintiff,
James M. Burrows, was an employee of P-M Engineers, Inc.,
a period of approximately 15 years,

-2-

(R 141).

While an
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employee, plaintiff was eligible and became a participant in the company's Plan (R 228).
During 1974, the plaintiff worked for P-M Engineers,
Inc., as a Job Inspector at the Main Post Office project
hereinafter referred to as "M.P.0."

(Deposition of paul

McGill as transcribed by R. Dean Sealy, p. 65, lines 5-6).
VESTED ACCOUNT BAIANCE
As of December 31,1974, the plaintiff had accumulated a gross balance of $25,183.06, in his Plan
Account with 85% vesting for a total of $21,405.60
accumulated vested benefits due to the plaintiff upon
his termination (R 345).
TERMINATION OF JAMES BURROWS
on December 26, 1974, James Burrows was called
to the off ice of paul McGill who told Burrows that he
was terminated.
James Burrows stated that he was told he was being
terminated because he would not purchase stock in other
P-M ventures and was therefore not a "team player."
(Dep. James Burrows, p. 3 lines 19-24)
paul McGill stated he terminated James Burrows because he was removing material from the M.P.O. site
and charging unauthorized mileage and overtime.

(Dep.

P. McGill as transcribed by sealy P. 71 lines 4-17)
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The termination was effective as of January 7, 1975.
(Dep. James Burrows, p. 31, lines 6-7)
APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS
plaintiff made application for his benefits due
under the plan.

The Administrative Committee met on

February 21, 1975, and March 7, 1975, and discussed the
issue of whether or not they should forfeit the plaintiff's
vested benefits.

(See minutes of Administrative committee

Meetings, Ex. 4 & 5 attached to Dep. of Paul McGill as
transcribed by Harmon)
The committee determined that it did not have sufficient information or grounds to forfeit the plaintiff's
vested benefits and asked plaintiff to arbitrate the
matter.

(EX. 4 attached to Dep. of p. McGill as transcribed

by Harmon.)
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
The plaintiff declined the offer to arbitrate the
matter.

The plaintiff made demand for payment of his

vested account benefits and when no payment was made,
the plaintiff commenced this legal action.
DEFENDANT s ANSWER
I

The defendants answered the plaintiff's complaint
alleging a right to forfeit plaintiff's vested account
benefits.

(R 285-297)
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The plaintiff's complaint was originally filed with
three other fellow employee plaintiffs who were denied
their vested account benefits.
the four

The lower court separated

(4) plaintiff's actions for trial.

The four

(4) plaintiffs all filed Motions for Summary

JUdgment to be heard on the same day at the same time.
one case was settled before the date of the hearing.

TWO cases were settled after oral argument had begun
but before it was completed.
The lower court took the remaining case under advisement and rendered its decision awarding summary JUdgment
to the plaintiff and dismissing defendant P-M Engineers
counter-claim.

Defend•nts appealed from the decision of

the lower court.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

UPON HIS TERMINATION WITH THE COMPANY THE PLAINTIFF
WAS AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF HIS VESTED
BENEFITS UNLESS THE PLAN COMMITTEE TOOK AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION TO FORFEIT THOSE BENEFITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE TERMS OF THE PLAN AND HAVING FAILED TO DO SO,
CANNOT FORFEIT PLAINTIFF'S BENEFITS NOW.
The provisions of the Plan relating to plaintiff's
benefits are as follows:
ARTICLE I
PURPOSE OF THE TRUST
"1.
It is the purpose of this trust to recognize
the contribution made to the successful operation of
the company by its various employees and to regard.
such contribution by establishing a system of profit
sharing for those employees who shall hereafter
qualify as participants under this trust, and for
the beneficiaries designated by such employees.
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2. This agreement has been executed for the exclusive
benefit of the Participants and their beneficiaries.
so far as possible, this agreement should be interpreted in a manner consistent with this intent and
with the intention of the company that this trust
satisfy those provision of the Internal Revenue code
relating to employees' trusts. 11
(R 7 3)
ARTICLE VI
Distribution of Benefits
11

2.
(a)
If a participant's employment with the company is terminated, except for retirement or by death
and except as provided in paragraph 7 of this Article,
after he has been a full time employee of the company
for two (2) years or more, he shall have a vested
interest in the amount then standing to his credit
equal to ten percent (10%) of such amount plus
ten percent (10%) of such amount for each full year
of full time employment in excess of two (2), up to
a total vested interest in such amount of eightyfive percent (85%). Within sixty (60) days of
such termination data he shall be paid the amount
standing to his credit in one lump sum, or, if the
committee elects to pay him such sum in approximately
equal annual installments over a period of years not
in excess of ten (10), he shall be paid the first of
equal annual installments within sixty (60) days of
such termination data. 11 • • • (R 85)
FORFEITURE

11
7.
If a Participant's status as an employee ceases
because of his discharge from employment for material
dishonesty or material violation of, or refusal to
bllow the instructions of the board of directors of
the company, the company shall promptly notify the
Committee of the discharge of a Participant for either
of these causes and the committee shall then determine
whether the company had just cause for such discharge.
Any determination by the committee that the provisions
of this Article are applicable shall be made within
ten (10) days after the receipt by the committee of
notice of discharge, and written notice of such determination shall be given by the committee to the
employee, addressed by registered mail to his last
known address. Within twenty (20) days after the
mailing of such notice, the former employee may appeal
for arbitration from the determination of the committee,
as hereafter provided in this Article.
Failure to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
_Q_

appeal within that time shall constitute an
irrevo~abl7 consent by the former employee to the
determination of the committee. An appeal shall be
taken by such employee by filing a written notice
of appeal for arbitration with the committee, and
by simultaneously designating one arbitrator from
among the employees of the company, regardless of
whether the person so designated is a participant
under this trust. The second arbitrator shall be
selected by the committee, and such arbitrator may
be an officer, stockholder or employee of the
company. The first and second arbitrators shall
select a third arbitrator. The decision of a
majority of the arbitrators shall be binding upon
such former employee, the committee, the Trustee,
the company, and all other parties, and shall be
enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Whenever the committee determines that such employee
has been discharged for cause and the time to appeal
has expired, or whenever an appeal for arbitration
is decided adversely to such employee, the amount
standing to the credit of such Participant shall
be allocated to the other Participants in accordance
with the provisions of Article v. Whenever the committee determines that there was no cause f:lr the
discharge of such employee, or whenever an appeal
for arbitration is decided in favor of such employee,
the amount standing to the credit of such employee
at the time of his discharge shall be distributed to
such former employee in accordance with the provisions
of paragraphs 2 and 5 of this Article."
(R 91)
A review of the provisions relating to forfeiture
makes it clear that unless the committee acts to declare
a forfeiture within the time limit (10 days) after
notification by the company, their right, if any, to
forfeit the account of a participant expires.
whetherthe committee was informed by the company of
the termination of James Burrows on December 26, 1974,
as stated by paul McGill,
lines 23-25; p. 6,

(Dep. paul McGill, p. 5,

lines 1-5) or at a later date does not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-9- OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

matter.

The first formal meeting of the committee took

place on February 21, 1975 and it is undisputed all
members of the committee knew of the reasons for termination of the plaintiff by that date.

The next formal_

meeting took place on March 7, 1975.
The official minutes of February 21, 1975 meeting
are as follows:
"The committee determined unanimously that the actions
were serious enough to warrant the arbitration and
Mr. McGill stated that there were unanswered questions
which had to be resolved prior to the distribution
of any funds ...
Mr. McGill stated that all of the employees in
question should be contacted so that their side of
the story could be told and the matter could be
cleared up immediately and the first distribution
made." (EX. p. 4 attached to Dep. of paul McGill,
Transcribed by Harmon)
The foregoing minutes disclose that even paul McGill
was not sure that the alleged acts of James Burrows
warranted the drastic action of forfeiture of his vested
account benefits.
The minutes reflect that the committee knew it had
to make a decision as to whether or not a forfeiture
would be declared.

The committee's attorney was present

and advising the committee.

(EX. p. 4 attached to Dep.

of Paul McGill transcribed by Harmon)
Rather than pay the vested benefits or declare a
forfeiture as required by the Plan, the committee did
neither, but instead invited plaintiff to arbitrate
the matter.
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The failure of the administrative committee to
make a decision and to declare a forfeiture within
the required ten (10) days,

(Article VI p. 7; R 91)

after notification by the company of the discharge
of James Burrows, deprived the committee of the right
to make or declare a forfeiture at some later date.
In defendants-appellants brief, it is contended
that a forfeiture was declared and the mere contention of such a fact raises an issue of fact and preeludes a Summary Judgment.
Defendants-appellants, however, are bound by
their own documentary evidence and their own testimony
as contained in the depositions of the only four

(4).

witnesses who would be competent to testify that
forfeiture was declared.

such evidence and testimony

demonstrates that no forfeiture was declared within
ten

(10) days or at all.
The minutes of the Administrative committee

(Ex. P. 4 and p. 5 attached to deposition of paul
McGill transcribed by Harmon), reflect that no forfeiture was declared on February 21, 1975 or March
7, 1975.
The deposition of Richard Klein, one of the
three members of the Administrative committee, makes
it clear that even as of the date of the deposition,
\

(Jan. 22, 1976), no forfeiture had been declared.
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"I say the committee didn't determine at that
time (Feb. 21, 1975) they would not pay the
benefits. The committee simply determined that
it would be called in for arbitration. In
other words, we did not determine he would not
be paid his benefits." (De:!:). ~ichard 1(_ l<lein
P. 15 Lines 17-20)
The depositions of the other two members of the
Administrative committee also demonstrate that no
forfeiture was declared on February 21, 1975; March
7, 1975; or at any time.
The deposition of Eugene Fortuna, the company
controller, a Trustee of the funds, and the accountant
for the Plan, demonstrates that as of December 31,
1975, (almost 12 months later), no forfeiture of the
vested account benefits of plaintiff had occurred.
(Dep. of Eugene Fortuna P. 20, lines 6-26; P. 21,
lines 1-3)

plaintiff's vested account benefits were

still shown as posted to his account on the official
ledger sheet as of December 31, 1975.

(Dep. of

Eugene Fortuna P. 21, lines 1-3)
No issue of fact exists concerning whether or
not the committee forfeited plaintiff's vested account benefits within the required ten (10) days.
The minutes of the Administrative committee, the
testimony of the three members of the committee and
the Trustee and accountant for the plan all demonstrate that no forfeiture was declared at any time,
let alone within the required ten (10) days.
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Since no forfeiture was declared within ten (10)
days after notification of termination by the company
or at all, the lower court found there was no issue
of fact and the right of the Administrative committee
to declare a forfeiture had expired.

The decision

of the lower court stated:
"That the defendants failed to follow the provisions of the Profit Sharing Plan, having
failed to make a "Determination of Forfeiture"
as required by the Plan and having failed to
establish the right to forfeit the plaintiff's
Profit Sharing Account, are not entitled to
retain the funds due plaintiff and the defendants, having failed to determine the funds
would be paid to plaintiff over a period of time,
and having failed to follow the provisions of
the Plan are obligated to pay plaintiff the sums
due plaintiff together with interest accrued
thereon."
(R432)
The foresoing decision was based upon the provisions of the Plan and the undisputed facts.

The re-

spondents request that it be upheld and sustained
by this court.
POINT II
JAMES BURROWS WAS AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO PAYMENT
OF HIS VESTED BENEFITS IN ONE LUMP SUM WITHIN SIXTY
(60) DAYS OF HIS TERMINATION WITH THE COMPANY.
James Burrows had been an employee of the company for approximately fifteen (15) years.

He had

become a participant in the plan and had accumulated
a total gross balance in his account of $25,183.06
as of December 31, 1974.

(R 345)
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His account had become 85% vested as of December
31, 1974 and as such James Burrows was entitled to
vested benefits of $21,405.60 upon his termination
with the company.

(R345)

The foregoing facts are

undisputed and are admitted by defendants-appellants.
payment of the benefits was automatic under the
terms of the plan.

Article VI

"Distribution of

Benefits", paragraph 2 (a) provides the following:
If a participant's employment with the
company is terminated, except for retirement
or by death and except as provided in paragraph
7 of this Article, after he has been a full
time employee of the company for two (2) years
or more, he shall have a vested interest in the
amount then standing to his credit equal to
ten percent (10%) of such amount plus ten percent (10%) of such amount for each full year
of full time employment in excess of two (2),
up to a total vested interest in such· amount
of eighty-five (85%) percent. Within sixty
(60) days of such termination data he shall be
paid the amount standing to his credit in one
lump sum, or, if the committee elects to pay
him such sum in approximately equal annual
installments over a period of years not in
excess of ten (10), he shall be paid the first
of equal annual installments within sixty (60)
days of such termination data.
(R 85)
The foregoing provisions of the Plan demonstrate that upon termination of an employee, the
vested benefits must be paid within sixty (60) days
unless the committee takes affirmative action to
defer payment of the benefits over a maximum period
of ten (10) annual equal yearly installments.
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The committee took no action to make a determination of deferred payment of benefits.

After the

expiration of sixty (60) days, the right to make a
determination of deferred payments expired and plaintiff became entitled to a lump sum distribution of
his benefits and the lower court so found:
" ... the defendants having failed to determine
the funds would be paid to the plaintiff over
a period of time ... are obligated to pay plaintiff the sums due the plaintiff, together with
interest accrued thereon."
(R 432)
It is admitted by defendants-appellants, that
the committee did not determine that it would pay
benefits to plaintiff over an extended or deferred
period and the foregoing decision of the lower court
is supported by the provisions of the Plan and undisputed facts.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED UPON
THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
TO FORFEIT THE PLAINTIFF'S VESTED BENEFITS
DUE UNDER THE PLAN.
Throughout defendants-appellants brief it continually refers to alleged "issues" of fact regarding
the conduct or alleged misconduct of James Burrows
and continually claims the lower court's decision
was based upon a resolution of issues of fact which
were in dispute.

A representative summary of such

allegations is found at page 10 of defendantsappellants brief as follows:
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"The lower court addressed itself to this
particular question and found that, as a matter
of law, the acts of the plaintiff did not constitute material dishonesty or the failure to
follow the instructions of the Board of Directors. At pages 477 through 482 of the transcript of the hearing on the Motion for SuITUllary
JUdgment, the court discussed a theory that
the acts of the plaintiff had to relate to his
employment in order that the right to forfeit
be invoked and, once again, the court found,
as a matter of law, these acts did not relate
to his employment and, therefore, the right
to forfeit was not established."
These claims and others like them throughout
the entirety of defendant's-appellant's Brief are
totally unsupported by the record.
The lower court's decision makes no reference
whatsoever to the conduct or alleged misconduct of
James Burrows.
"l. That the defendants failed to follow
the provisions of the Profit Sharing Plan, having failed to make a determination of "forfeiture"
as required by the plan and having failed to
establish the right to forfeit the plaintiff's
Profit Sharing Account, are not entitled to
retain the funds due plaintiff and the defendants, having failed to determine the funds
would be paid to plaintiff over a period of
time, and having failed to follow the provisions
of the plan, are obligated to pay plaintiff the
sums due plaintiff together with interest accrued
thereon."
(R 432)

The "issues", if any, relating to the conduct
or alleged misconduct of James Burrows and the interpretation of the meaning of "material dishonesty"
were not decided by the lower court.

The lower court
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found that no forfeiture was declared by the Plan
committee and therefore the determination of other
"issues" became unnecessary.
Although the lower court explored the other
"issues" thoroughly during oral argument, it did
not base its decision upon them.

POINT IV
DEFENDANTS DID NOT RAISE ANY ISSUES
OF FACT AT THE TRIAL LEVEL.
The question of whether or not the conduct
or alleged misconduct of James Burrows constituted
material dishonesty was not decided by the lower
court and is not,before this court now.
The defendants-appellants claim that by merely
contending an issue of fact exists, their contention
alone precludes a summary JUdgment.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that after a Motion for summary JUdgment
is filed, the defending party may not rely upon
mere contentions or allegations alone to raise a
genuine issue for trial.

Rule 56

(e) provides as

follows:
"When a Motion for summary JUdgment is made
and supported as provided in this Rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, .but
his response by Affidavits or as otherwise.
provided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.
If he does not so respond,
summary JUdgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him."
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The case of Reliable Furniture vs. Fidelity
Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. 16 Utah 2nd
211, 398 p2nd 685 (1965) does not nullify Rule 56
(e) as contended by defendants-appellants in their
brief.

The Reliable Furniture case involved a

dismissal of an action by the trial court at a
pre-Trial conference even though no motions for
summary JUdgment or supporting Affidavits had
been filed.

This Court in the Reliable Furniture

company case stated the following:
"It is appropriate to reiterate that the dismissal of an action at pre-Trial, which
peremptorily turns a party out of court, is
a drastic action which should be used sparingly and with great caution. This is especially true where the dismissal is ordered
without any Motion for Sununary JUdgment being
filed to put the party on notice of such contemplated action and afford him an opportunity
to meet it." (Emphasis added)
The Reliable Furniture company case is not
applicable to the case at hand.

rn the case at

hand a Motion for Summary JUdgment and an extensive memorandum was filed and served upon the
opposing party.

The opposing party (defendants-

appellants) had ample time and did respond to the
Motion for Summary JUdgment.
Prior to the time that plaintiff filed its
Motion for Summary JUdgment, plaintiff took the
depositions of all of the defendants and every
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witness known to be competent to testify on the
issues raised in the pleadings.

In addition, ex-

tensive interrogatories were served upon the defendants.
Plaintiff then filed a Motion for summary
JUdgment and prepared a fifty (50) page memorandum
(R 352-401) in support of its Motion for summary
JUdgment.

The memorandum extracted applicable

portions of the nine (9) depositions and the
answers to interrogatories submitted by the
defendants.
The defendants-appellants responded to the
memorandum but did not cite any portions of the
depositions or interrogatories to support a claim
that an issue of fact existed.

A review of defen-

dants' memorandum (R 422-430) further discloses
that no Affidavits were filed to raise any issue
of fact.
The defendants are bound by their Answers to
Interrogatories and their depositions.

The wit-

nesses who were deposed were subjected to examination by both sides and their testimony appears
to be clear and unambiguous.
Defendants-appellants contend that issues of
fact exist but they did not cite any record to
substantiate their claim at the trial court level.
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POINT V
THE CLAIM MADE BY DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS THAT
THE CONDUCT OF JAMES BURROWS WASN'T AurHORIZED
BY PAUL McGILL DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A PRESUMPTION THAT THE CONDUCT OF JAMES BURROWS
WAS IMPROPER OR MATERIALLY DISHONEST.
The question of whether or not the conduct
or alleged misconduct of James Burrows constituted
"material dishonesty" was not decided by the lower
court.

Because that "issue" was not decided by

the lower court it is not before this court now.
However, since defendants'-appellants' brief
directs so much attention to the word "unauthorized"
plaintiff will briefly comment on the defendants'
use of the word "unauthorized."
Defendants-appellants use the word "unauthorized" as though it were synonomous with the phrase
"improper" or "materially dishonest" when in fact
such is not the case.
REMOVAL OF MATERIALS
James Burrows, with the permission of the
various sub-contractors, removed scrap and surplus
bricks, scrap lumber and a power pole from the
construction site.

All of the competent witnesses

to the foregoing events have been deposed.

There

is no evidence or record that will support a
contention that James Burrows did not have the
permission of the foregoing to remove the said
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Defendants-appellants merely contend that Paul
McGill did not "authorize" the removal of the materials.
The record does not contain any evidence that prior
to the removal of the materials Paul McGill or anyone ever told James Burrows or anyone they could
not remove such scrap materials.

In fact, the

record shows that it was common practice in the
construction industry for site personnel to remove
such scrap materials.

(See Dep. of Floyd Young)

After the events occurred, Paul McGill told James
Burrows such conduct was not "authorized" by him.
MILEAGE
Defendants-appellants do not deny that James
Burrows incurred mileage on company business and
that he submitted claims to the company for reimbursement and was paid by them.

They merely

assert that Paul McGill did not "authorize" the
mileage reimbursement.

They claim an issue now

exists as to whether such conduct constituted
"material dishonesty. "
OVERTIME
James Burrows was working as an inspector on
a Federal project, the MP 0 (Main post Office).
His duties were to inspect the construction of
the building.

He was also directed to plot curves
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and graphs.

He stayed on site during working

hours inspecting the building.

After working

hours, he plotted the curves and graphs.
Defendants-appellants do not contend that
James Burrows did not work the overtime or that
it was not worked while performing company business.
They do not contend that time card claims were
not submitted to appropriate office personnel and
paid by them.

They merely contend that the over-

time was not previously "authorized" by Paul McGill.
They contend this raises an issue of whether or
not the conduct of James Burrows was "materially
dishonest."

. It might be noted parenthetically

that Federal Law requires payment of the overtime
hours worked whether Paul McGill "authorized" the
payment or not.

Neither the record nor the testi-

many of Paul McGill established that James Burrows
was told not to work overtime until after the
overtime was incurred.

POINT VI
THE COURTS HAVE UNIFORMLY HELD THAT A
PROFIT SHARING AND RETIREMENT PLAN IS A
CONTRACTUALLY BINDING DOCUMENT BETWEEN
PARTIES AND THE FORFEITURE CLAUSES CONTAINED THEREIN ARE TO BE CONSTRUED
LIBERALLY AND IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE.
Although the language of most profit Sharing
Plans indicate that a trust is created, the courts
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have held that such an arrangement creates a
binding contract between the employee and the
administrative committee of the Plan.
In the case of Russell vs. Princeton r.aboratories, Inc., 321 A 2d 800 N. J.

(1967), the

court stated in regards to the profit Sharing
plan that:
'When an employee renders service in response to the promise of the trust plan,
he acquires a right no less contractual
than if the plan were expressly bargained
for."
In the case of Voight vs. South Side Laundry

& Dry Cleaners, Inc., 128 N.

w.

2d 411 Wis.

(1964),

the court stated:
"Non-contributory pension plans are held to
give rise to a contractual obligation by
the employer to pay pension benefits to
the employees entitled thereto under the
plan communicated to the employees where
the employees thereaf~er remain in the
employer's employment and render service
for the requisite period. Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. (1960), 171 Ohio St.
405, 171 N. E. 2d 518; Ball v. Victor
Adding Machine co. (5th cir 1956) I 236
F. 2d 170: Siegel v. First Pennsylvania
Banking & Trust co. (D.C. pa., 1961, 201
F. Supp. 664; Anno. 42 A.L.R. 2d 461, 467.
The same principle is applicable to profit
sharing plans. zwolanck v. Baker Mfg. co.
(1912), 150 Wis. 517, 137 N.W. 769.
(Emphasis added)
In the case of Levitt v. Billy Penn corporation, 283 A 2d 873 pa.

(1971), the court stated:
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"The employee has a contractual right to
enforce the plan according to its terms and
such benefits may not be denied arbitrarily
even where the words such as "absolute discretion" are used, such terms do not give
the administrative body unfettered discretion. It is necessary to look at the plan
itself to define the limit of the Trustee's
power."
The courts have also adopted the same rules
of construction in relation

to

Plans.

In Russell

v. princeton Laboratories, Inc., previously cited
above, the court stated:
"These plans are to be liberally construed
in favor of the employee."
In Levitt v. Billy Penn corporation, also
previously cited above, the court stated:
"The question then is whether the employee
should suffer a forfeiture of something he
has earned. Forfeiture being disfavored
we should take any tenable view to avoid
it. Indeed these plans are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee."
In

the case of Fretzsche v. First western

Bank & Trust Company, 336 p. 2d 589 cal.

(1959)

the court stated in regard to a pension plan:
"Pension plans are to be liberally construed
in favor of the employee.
Klench v. Board
of Pension Fund commissioners, 1926, 79
cal. App. 171, 186, 249 p. 46.
The general rule is that pension plans,
formulated by an employer, are construed
m~st strongly against the employer,
Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer co., 1937,
57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N.E. 2d 878, 879.
In Food Fairs Stores, Inc., vs. Greeley,
264 Md. 105, 285 A 2d 632,
stated:

(1972), the court
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"Forfeiture clauses should be strictly and
narrowly construed - the forfeiture of the
right of work is to be avoided whenever the
court can discern a rational basis for that
result."
The court also stated:
"Even though the employer has a legitimate
interest in the protection of its cliental,
the restrictive covenant will not be enforced
if under all the circumstances the covenant is
unduly restrictive of the employee's freedom.
The right to labor or to use one's skill,
talents or experience for one's own benefit
or furnish them to another for compensation
is a natural and inherent right of the
individual."
POINT VII
DEFENDANT'S COUNTER-CLAIM IS BASED UPON A
BY-LAW OF THE CORPORATION WHICH IS EXPRESSLY
PROHIBITED BY PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CODE,
THE CORPORATE CHARTER AND IS VOID AS BEING
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
Plaintiff worked for Steel contractors during
the summer of 1974 for 2 or 3 weeks on weekends
and in the evening.

He received approximately

$400.00 - $600.00.

In addition, plaintiff per-

formed detailing work in 1972, one or two nights
a week for several months.

This work was per-

formed for pedco Detailing who paid the plaintiff
approximately $350.00 - $400.00.
Defendant alleges this conduct which occurred
two years prior to the termination of plaintiff
justifies the forfeiture of the Profit Sharing
Account.
Defendant's counter-claim alleges:
"l.
That plaintiff was a stockholder of the
defendant corporation.
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2. That the By-Laws of the Corporation
obligate the stockholders to the corporation
and become a contractually binding obligation upon the stockholders merely because of
the acquisition of stock of the corporation
by the stocknolder.
3. That No. 6 of the By-Laws of P M Engineers,
Inc., duly adopted by said corporation on
the 15th day of September, 1976, states as
follows:
'All stockholders agree that any remuneration to them by an outside firm or individual
for work performed of a nature engaged in
by the corporation are monies or value due
and payable to the corporation.
In other
words, stockholder may not engage in outside engineering or related services as an
individual, nor may one or more stockholders
enter into a business which provides such
services and is intended to generate individual profit. This paragraph illustrates
the intent and reason for the birth of this
corporation, to-wit: A welding together of
individual abilities of the stockholders
as a team for the mutual benefit of the
corporation and themselves. Furthermore,
it is the intent and wish that each stockholder receive monetary benefit in direct
proportion to his output, both efficiency
wise and workwise. Therefore, in consequence, there will be no reason for outside
work on the part of the stockholders and
a high incentive remaining.'
4. That said By-Law constitutes a contract
as between plaintiff and defendant, p M
Engineers, Inc.
6. That while an employee and shareholder
of PM Engineers, Inc., in violation of
said By-Laws, plaintiff James M. Burrows
did work for outside individuals or firms,
including Steel contractors, Inc. and Pedco
Detailing Service.
Said work performed was
of a similar nature to that engaged in by
Defendant, p M Engineers, Inc., and was
performed for a potential client of P M
Engineers, Inc.
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7. That said acts constitute a breach of
said contract and Plaintiff is liable to
P M Engineers, Inc. in the amount of any
remuneration received for services rendered
to said outside firms or individuals; that
Plaintiff should account for all sums received while working for said outside firms
or individuals.
8. That the acts and conduct of the Plaintiff, James M. Burrows, were willful and
malicious and that by reason of said conduct
the Defendant is entitled to punitive damages
and attorney's fees in this matter; and that
a reasonable sum to allow the Defendant is
that of $20,000.00."
The By-Law referred to in defendants' counterclaim is worded in such a way as to appear to
require a stockholder to pay money to the corporation or to be liable to the corporation for an
amount in excess of the purchase price of the
stock.
The Articles of Incorporation of P M Engineers
expressly prohibit such a By-Law.

The Articles of

Incorporation contain the following statements:
"ARTICLE XIV
The private property of the stockholder
shall not be liable for the debts and
obligations of the corporation.
ARTICLE XVI
The stock of this corporation shall be
non-assessable.
ARTICLE XIX
The Board of Directors may adopt Byr,aws not inconsistent with these
Articles and with law of the State
of utah and the united states of
America and may repeal and amend the
same from time to time."
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As the above Articles of Incorporation indicate, the By-r.aws shall not be inconsistent with
the r.,aws of the state of Utah.

The Utah code

Annotated, Section 16-10-4 (1) 1953, allows a
corporation:
"···to make and alter By-r.aws, not inconsistent with its Articles of Incorporation
or with the laws of this State, for the
administration and regulation of the
affairs of the corporation."
The utah code Annotated, Section 16-10-23,
1953, entitled, Liability of Subscribers and
Shareholders states:
"A holder or a subscriber to shares of a
corporation shall be under no obligation to
the corporation or its creditors with respect to such shares other than the obligation to pay to the corporation the full
consideration for which such shares were
issued or to be issued .•• " (Emphasis added)
The statute clearly provides that the only
obligation owed by a stockholder to a corporation
is to pay for the shares of stock issued to him.
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 34-34-2, defines the public policy of Utah in relation to
contracts which restrict employment as follows:
"It is hereby declared to be the public
policy of the State of Utah that the right
of persons to work, whether in private employment or for the state, its counties, cities,
school districts, or other political subdivision, shall not be denied or abridged
~n account of membership or non-membership
in any labor union, labor organization or
any other type of association; and further,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

That the right to live includes the right
to work. The exercise of the right to work
must be protected and maintained free from
undue restraints and coercion."
(Emphasis
added)
rt is therefore clear that a mere restriction on employment is against the public
policy of the State of utah.
Not only does the By-Law purport to restrict
employment, but also it purports to make a stockholder liable to the corporation.
The defendant company had the stockholders
sign a Buy-Sell Agreement, but the Buy-Sell Agreement makes no mention of any such "obligation" as is
contained in By-Law number six.

see Exhibi.ts 2 and

3 attached to the Amended Interrogatories of defendant.
(EX. p-2 attached to Deposition of Paul McGill)
A careful reading of the By-Law makes it quite
clear that the By-Law was adopted by the rncorporators
of the defendant company and that each incorporator was
to receive remuneration based upon his stock ownership
and work output.
Since it is clear that:

(1)

plaintiff was not

an incorporator of the defendant company and;

(2)

Plaintiff was paid on an hourly basis; this By-Law
was never intended to be applied to plaintiff.
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since the defendant paid the plaintiff on an
hourly basis, it is clear that the defendant company
breached its own supposed contract and therefore waived
any right to claim that the alleged contract binds plaintiff.
Not one case cited in defendants-appellants brief
to support its counter-claim applies to the fact
situation of the case at hand.

No case cited re-

quires a stockholder to pay money to the corporation
because a By-r.aw prohibits the stockholder from working
for other companies without paying his earnings to the
corporation in which he owns stock.
CONCLUSION
l.

Plaintiff was automatically entitled to

his vested benefits due under the plan unless
defendants-appellants acted to forfeit those benefits
in the manner and the time prescribed by the plan.
The defendants- appellants did not forfeit the benefits
within ten (10) days as required or at all and the
right if any to forfeit the benefits expired.
2.

Plaintiff was automatically entitled to a

lump sum distribution of his benefits within sixty
(60) days of termination unless within that time the
plan committee acted to defer payments.

Admittedly

the committee took no such action and plaintiff is
entitled to a lump sum distribution.
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3.

The lower court's decision was based upon

failure of the defendants-appellants to act to
forfeit the benefits due plaintiff - - not upon
a resolution of supposed "issues" of fact.
4.

Defendants-appellants did not raise any

"issues" of fact at the trial level and cannot
now claim that such issues exist.
5.

Defendants-appellants characterization of

the word "unauthorized" is inappropriate.

The

record does not support a claim that the supposed
"unauthroized" acts were also "materially dishonest."
6.

pension and profit Sharing Plans should

be liberally construed to benefit the employee._
7.

The counter-claim of defendant P-M Engineers

against plaintiff is wholly without merit and is
based upon a By-Law which is expressly prohibited
by the utah code, the corporate charter itself and public policy.
8.

The decision by the lower court is amply

supported by the record, is just and equitable and
should be sustained and upheld.
Respectfully Submitted,
SCHOENHALS & FAUST
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~~' ,,_,'
Jack L- Schoenhals
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James H. paust
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